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In this article I will argue that Walter Benjamin’s critique of bourgeois humanism, and 
more specifically his writings on film on the same theme, can be considered a precursor of 
recent critical accounts of posthumanism. Recently Benjamin scholars such as Sami 
Khatib, Matthew Charles and Carlo Salzani have recognized that some creatures he 
devised, namely the barbarian (Barbar) and the inhuman (Unmensch), could be considered 
predecessors of the posthuman.1 In this article I will focus on these and other posthuman 
themes in Benjamin’s writings on film, especially those which emerged during the period 
of the “destructive character” (1931-1933), in which he heavily criticized the centrality of 
the individual, bourgeois subject that made its first appearance with the Enlightenment. 
For the last thirty years, posthumanism has attempted to de-centre the traditional 
model of the human devised according to the principles of the Cartesian subject. This 
model has been criticized for positing a white, European, male, liberal self. Posthumanism 
thus begins from the premise that “We are not all humans if by humans we understand 
the creature familiar to us from the Enlightenment and its legacy.”2 This primary critique 
has led to a broader criticism of the understanding of the human as the measure of all 
things – that is, to the detriment of other life forms. Through a closer engagement with 
science and technology, posthumanism has argued that the traditional binary opposition 
between nature and culture has been blurred and, in addition, has claimed that the 
incorporation of technology into the human body is already changing the parameters of 
how human nature should be understood. From these premises, posthumanism has 
generated many – often contradictory – theories about what posthumans should look like. 
By bringing Benjamin into dialogue with recent literature on posthumanism, I will argue 
that his writings on technology in general, and on film in particular, contain similar 
concerns to those of posthumanism, especially in regard to the way that nature (including 
human nature) and technology interweave.   
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In this article I will analyse Benjamin’s writings on cinema in relation to his 
“anthropological-materialist” idea of the creation of a collective techno-body. From his 
early anthropological texts of the late 1910s and early 1920s, Benjamin devised the idea of 
the creation of a collective body in and through  technology. He thought that human beings 
could adapt technologies, as simple as they might be, into their bodies as limbs. In essays 
such as “Poverty and Experience” (1933) and “The Work of Art in the Age of Its 
Technological Reproducibility” (1935-39) Benjamin envisaged cinema as an exemplary 
space in which a technological innervation into the body of the audience could be 
produced. Film figures such as Mickey Mouse were examples of what human beings 
would resemble once they had merged with technology. Thus, I will argue that his 
theories around technology, the human body and cinema are useful in reconsidering our 
relationship with nature and technology in a (desirable, rather than actual) posthuman 
condition. 
ANTHROPOLOGICAL MATERIALISM AND THE NEW MATERIALISMS
Benjamin introduced the concept of “anthropological materialism” in his essay 
“Surrealism: The Last Snapshot of the European Intelligentsia” (1929). He defined this 
new brand of materialism as a fusion of political materialism and physical creatureliness. 
In opposition to the “metaphysical materialism” of authors such as Georgi Plekhanov and 
Nikolai Bukharin, Benjamin aimed to produce a type of materialism that would focus on 
the materiality of the body, be it individual or collective. Adorno, however, disapproved 
of Benjamin’s anthropological materialism as “an undialectical ontology of the body.”3 For 
Adorno, the human body cannot represent the measure of all concreteness, as Benjamin 
wanted to convey. Notwithstanding Adorno’s criticism, Benjamin’s conception of the 
body is hardly to be understood ontologically. Anthropological materialism aimed to 
bring materialism closer to the human body as it develops historically in its relationship 
with nature and other human beings. For that reason, Benjamin takes technology as the 
medium to (re)organize the interplay between humans and nature. 
This article aims to bring Benjamin’s “anthropological materialism,” his own brand of 
materialism and the basis for his theories around the incorporation of technology into the 
body, into dialogue with the new materialisms. Through this dialogue, I will claim that 
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Benjamin provides a highly interesting insight into reconsidering not only the way we 
think of our relation to technology, but also other material elements. I will also explore 
how Benjamin problematized the binary opposition between nature and culture, which is 
a common concern of both the new materialisms and posthumanism. Benjamin’s interest 
in the materiality of the human body is thus echoed by the increasing academic interest in 
matter. This revival of materialism can arguably be dated back to the turn to the body in 
1990s feminism, although this had become more matter-oriented by the following decade. 
Indeed, this interest – primarily a reaction to the privileged position of language to the 
detriment of the material in poststructuralism – has entered the posthuman agenda in 
recent years. According to Francesca Ferrando, the new materialisms try to problematize 
the apparent opposition between language and matter: “biology is culturally mediated as 
much as culture is materialistically constructed.”4 
Diana Coole and Samantha Frost have argued that this renewal of materialism means 
“taking heed of developments in the natural sciences as well as attending to 
transformations in the ways we currently produce, reproduce, and consume our material 
environment.” For that reason, the new materialisms reconsider the human’s material 
practices with regard to “the ways we labor on, exploit, and interact with nature.”5 This 
critique is shared with posthumanism, which rejects the domination of human beings 
over other life forms. According to Pramod K. Nayar, critical posthumanism studies and 
criticizes the “power relations and discourses that have historically situated the human 
above other life forms, and in control of them.”6 I will argue that Benjamin introduces a 
relevant critique of this domination of nature by human beings and of the role of 
technology in this uneven power relation, which is according to him self-destructive. 
Benjamin’s critique of the instrumental mastery of nature is most clearly introduced in 
the last section of his book of aphorisms One-Way Street (1928), “To the Planetarium.”7 
There, he denounces what he calls the “imperialist-capitalist conception of technology,” 
which is the human use of technology in order to dominate nature. Benjamin argues that, 
because of its lust for profit, the ruling class has followed and endorsed this conception, 
thus betraying the positive potential of technology. For him, the domination of nature also 
entails the domination of any life form, human beings included. For that reason, he claims 
that such a conception of technology has led to a bloodbath, referring first of all to the 
First World War and its deployment of warfare technology. Benjamin claims that our 
relationship with nature should be one of interplay and technology should be used to 
CINEMA 7 · MOURENZA! 30
enhance an equal relationship between humans and nature. In other words, technology 
should be used to improve our relationship with nature, instead of using it as a form of 
(self-)abuse. 
From his first anthropological texts, Benjamin promoted a union with nature that would 
incorporate both living and non-living matter. In “Outline of the Psychophysical 
Problem” (1922-1923), he claims that humankind can create a collective body through the 
incorporation of nature – the nonliving, plants and animals – into the body of mankind “by 
virtue of the technology in which the unity of its life is formed.”8  Benjamin thereby 
suggests that technology functions as the medium in which humanity can form a single 
body with the other elements of nature – because the human is itself nature. He also argues 
that everything that completes humanity’s happiness should be considered as part of this 
bodily life, as its organs. For that reason, Benjamin suggests in “Theories of German 
Fascism” (1930) that technology should be conceived of as a key to happiness.9 He resumes 
this idea in “To the Planetarium,” and argues that technology is organizing a new physis, or 
collective body for mankind, different to previous configurations of humanity such as 
families and nations. In this way, he claims that technology is already changing the way 
human beings relate to each other and organize collectively. Although in that same text he 
had prefigured a miscarried reception of technology, epitomized by the use of chemical 
warfare in the First World War, Benjamin believed that the new collective physis organised 
by technology could still be rescued and adopted by humankind. Once the recovery of this 
techno-body was complete, mankind would take a new step in its development towards a 
better relation to nature and to itself.
Benjamin thus introduces an environmentalist concern for our conception and 
reception of technology which may be pertinent to a reconsideration of the posthuman 
interaction with nature. However, one need only look at the language used by Benjamin 
in this passage to understand that his theory is hardly scientific. The Marxist 
environmentalist scholar John Bellamy Foster has for example criticized the “ecologic 
critique” developed by the Frankfurt School for being “almost entirely culturalist in form, 
lacking any knowledge of ecological science.” By way of contrast, he compares such a 
critique to Marx, whose theory of the metabolic rift was based on the work of Justus von 
Liebig, the founder of organic chemistry, and entailed an analysis of the real, material 
alienation of nature.10 Any criticism of Benjamin emerging from the new materialisms 
would undoubtedly point out his unscientific approach to this question. 
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The problem with the new materialisms, however, is that they go as far as to provide 
(inert) matter with a form of vitalism. Thus, new materialists argue that science has 
revealed that matter has its own modes of self-transformation and self-organization and, 
therefore, should not be conceived of as purely inert or passive, but as having its own 
agency. This conception, they argue, disputes that only humans have an agency “and the 
corollary presumption that humans have the right or ability to master nature.”11 Although 
the conclusion is well-aimed, this view is dangerous in the sense that it equates human 
agency with that of nature and, therefore, also a politically, ethically-bounded agency to a 
natural one. As I will show later, Benjamin’s call for a new, more real humanism criticizes 
the bourgeois, imperialist idea that humans have the right to master nature without 
adopting the dangerously anti-humanist belief that any material element, either inert or 
alive, should have the same rights as human beings. 
Benjamin’s unscientific, but socially and politically pertinent, theory on the 
relationship of society and nature would perhaps be perfected through incorporating the 
contributions of scholars such as Manuel Sacristán, James O’Connor, John Bellamy Foster, 
Marina Fischer-Kowalsky, Michael Löwy and Paul Burkett, who have addressed 
ecological problems from a Marxist point of view with a more scientific base. Nonetheless, 
I argue that his sensitivity to the way we relate to nature – which he extends to animals, as 
I will show later – is highly relevant in reconsidering our conceptions of science and 
technology and the social consequences they may entail.
THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN HUMANS AND NATURE
 
If technology is the medium by which to reorganize and establish a better relationship 
between humanity and nature, cinema is the arena wherein the correct interplay between 
nature and humans is rehearsed. As I will expand below, the space of cinema reception 
appears as a training ground for the incorporation of “second technology” into the 
collective body of mankind – in this case represented by the audience. Benjamin gives 
some clues as to how this technological interpenetration of film image and body should 
take place in essays such as “Surrealism,” “Experience and Poverty” and “The Work of 
Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility.” In the first essay, Benjamin argues 
that the praxis of the surrealists opens up a space in which the “energies of intoxication” 
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supplied by surrealism can set off a revolutionary discharge through the bodily 
innervations of the collective. He thinks that, in their practice, the surrealists had 
succeeded in bringing together what he calls image-space (Bildraum) and body-space 
(Leibraum), challenging the traditional conception of art, in which the viewer stands at a 
distance of two metres from the artwork. Reading the “Surrealism” essay in connection 
with Benjamin’s writings on film, Miriam Hansen argues that the technologies of 
reproduction had also opened an expanding image-space which had become – as the 
surrealists recognized – the habitat of the collective.12 Benjamin understood that in this 
space, opened up by technology, a new physis could be re-appropriated and embodied by 
the collective. The collision between body- and image-space in cinemas could supply the 
necessary energies to innervate and, therefore, empower the collective body in a 
revolutionary way, as he demanded at the end of the essay on surrealism. Uwe Steiner 
argues that the specific conditions of the film medium led Benjamin to perceive the 
creation of a collective body. In this way, the interaction of human beings with technology 
in that space appears as a rehearsal for a revolution that pursues the innervation of the 
technological organs of the collective. “What is merely practiced in the cinema,” says 
Steiner, “exists for real in the revolution,” when the collective attempts to gain mastery 
over the new techno-body.13 Benjamin uses the Freudian term “innervation” here, which 
means “a rush of energy through the nervous system” to stress, on the one hand, the 
corporeality of the collective physis to which technology adapts itself and, on the other, the 
energy which, according to Benjamin, is deployed by technology — an energy which can 
be both advantageous and destructive, depending on whether the technology is put to 
humane use or, on the contrary, strips human needs. 
It may seem at first sight that, for Benjamin, cinema automatically enables a (positive) 
collective technological innervation. Nonetheless, in all his writings on film he demands, 
on the one hand, a political effort to bring a liberated film technology closer to the 
audience and, on the other, a critical and de-mystified representation of technology. Thus, 
while he denounces the fact that film capital uses the revolutionary potentials of film for 
counterrevolutionary purposes – for example, by adding a cultic character to the movie 
star – he praises Soviet films like Vertov’s Three Songs of Lenin (Tri pesni o Lenine, 1934) 
and Eisenstein’s The General Line (Staroye i novoye, 1929) for providing a new use of the 
camera and using amateur actors. In “On the Present Situation of Russian Film” (1927), he 
also celebrates the use of traveling cinemas to arrive at the remotest regions of the Soviet 
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Union and provide historical, political and technical information to the peasants.14 For 
Benjamin, these efforts to expose such audiences to film and radio were the biggest mass-
psychological experiments hitherto undertaken and turned the Soviet Union into a 
grandiose laboratory for technological innervation. However, he also considers that the 
Soviet “new man” is not critical enough to appreciate irony and scepticism in technical 
matters.15 Benjamin bases this on his abhorrence of the Russian comic actor Igor Iljinsky, 
who he considers a bad imitator of Chaplin, and the fact that American slapstick has not 
succeeded in the Soviet Union. Certainly he held American slapstick, and Chaplin in 
particular, in greater esteem. Through his characteristically syncopated gestures, Chaplin 
allegorically represented the alienation of his contemporaries in their everyday interaction 
with technology. Through his films, Benjamin argued, the audience could perform a more 
therapeutic reception of technology, resulting in a kind of catharsis via which spectators 
were able to receive a psychic immunization against the tensions engendered by the rapid 
technologization of society.  
It is in “Experience and Poverty” that Benjamin explains how, in cinema reception, the 
audience can collectively embody and innervate the energy supplied by films. Mickey 
Mouse and his friends appear here as paradigmatic figures which show new, possible 
rearrangements of technology into the human body. 
Tiredness is followed by sleep, and then it is not uncommon for a dream to make up 
for the sadness and discouragement of the day—a dream that shows us in its realized 
form the simple but magnificent existence for which the energy is lacking in reality. The 
existence of Mickey Mouse is such a dream for contemporary man. His life is full of 
miracles—miracles that not only surpass the wonders of technology, but make fun of 
them. For the most extraordinary thing about them is that they all appear, quite without 
any machinery, to have been improvised out of the body of Mickey Mouse, out of his 
supporters and prosecutors, and out of the most ordinary pieces of furniture, as well as 
from trees, clouds, and the sea. Nature and technology, primitiveness and comfort, have 
completely merged.16
Benjamin returns here to the image of an electric discharge introduced in the 
“Surrealism” essay to refer to the empowering quality of art on a collective body. In the 
reception of Mickey Mouse films, Benjamin argues that a similar interpenetration between 
image- and body-space takes place. Indeed, in a note written in relation to “Experience 
and Poverty,” “Erfahrungsarmut,” Benjamin states that these films may be 
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incomprehensible to an individual, but not to an entire audience, since Mickey Mouse 
governs the whole public rhythmically.17  The reactions to these images are therefore 
regrouped and concentrated into a mass, which acts as a body precisely because 
technology has been so interpenetrated into the audience that it moves according to the 
rhythm set up by the cartoons. This reading, however, would miss the relevance of 
representation. What Benjamin appreciates in Mickey Mouse cartoons is that they 
hyperbolize the promises of technology and, at the same time, improvise out of them a 
regime of play and dance. Technology does not appear as a mechanization or ossification 
of the body, as many contemporary critiques of technology depicted it, but as if 
technology had already been adapted and embodied by the characters – that is to say, as if 
technology had become their own nature. This interpenetration between nature and 
technology which occurs in Mickey Mouse films and in the cinema audience is a constant 
in Benjamin’s oeuvre, as well as in contemporary debates on posthumanism. 
THE NATUR/KULTUR DEBATE
One of the most important achievements of posthumanism is to have called into question 
the traditional dualism between nature and culture. Scholars on posthumanism such as 
Rosi Braidotti have argued that, due to scientific and technological advances, the borders 
between nature and culture have been blurred.18 This idea was already present in Donna 
Haraway’s seminal text “A Cyborg Manifesto” (1983), in which she claimed that, because 
of the reconception of organism and machine, “the certainty of what counts as nature is 
undermined, probably fatally.”19 Benjamin was already aware of the blurring boundaries 
between nature and culture – or, at least, between nature and Kultur or civilization – and 
thus criticized the traditional dualism between them through the concepts of “natural 
history” and “second nature.”  
Adorno was probably the most perceptive author to assert the centrality of these two 
concepts to Benjamin’s philosophy. I will, in fact, draw on Adorno’s reworking of 
Benjamin’s concepts to claim their relevance for the present discussion. Adorno first used 
Benjamin’s concept of “natural history” in his 1932 lecture “The Idea of Natural History,” 
in which he aimed “to dialectically overcome the usual antithesis of nature and history.”20 
This was directed particularly against the tradition of subjectivistic idealism, which 
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understood nature in opposition to spirit and history, and the ontological interpretation of 
history proposed by Martin Heidegger in his Being and Time (1927).21 Adorno argued that 
history and nature each have two poles: one dynamic and the other static. Nature has thus 
a double character: on the one hand, a positive, materialist pole, referring to concrete, 
existing living beings and, on the other, a negative, mythical one, in which nature is 
understood as the world not yet incorporated into history, not penetrated by reason. In 
this latter pole, nature is out of human control and mythically understood as “what is 
eternally there.” History, similarly, insofar as it was determined by the fact that it was only 
reproducing the same social relations, could be conceived of as natural rather than 
historical. Adorno wanted to maintain these two poles, i.e. transitoriness and myth, for his 
project of negative dialectics. Otherwise, if nature and history were posited as theoretical 
ontological principles, the double character of both nature and history would be lost and 
thus either social conditions would be affirmed to be “natural” or the historical process 
would ontologically be posited as “essential.” The irrational material suffering of history 
could therefore be understood as mere contingency, as in the case of Hegel, or as 
something essential to history, as in Heidegger. The result, argues Susan Buck-Morss, 
would always be “the ideological justification of the given social order.”22 This concept, in 
conclusion, is particularly useful in opposing the traditional dualistic understanding of 
nature vs. culture, as well as nature vs. history and civilization.  
Benjamin’s division of nature into “first” and “second nature” in the first version of 
“The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility” (1935) follows a similar 
dialectical structure. It was in fact Adorno who suggested to him in a letter that he use this 
term.23 “Second nature” can be understood as the world of human convention or man-
made structures, in opposition to “first nature,” an untouched nature that develops 
independently of the agency of man. In the “Work of Art” essay, Benjamin describes film 
technology, that is, a technology liberated from a ritual function, as a “second nature.” 
Benjamin points out that this “second nature” now stands in relation to society as 
elemental as “first nature” once stood to primeval society: “Humans of course invented, 
but no longer by any means master this second nature which they now confront; they are 
thus just as compelled to undertake an apprenticeship as they were once when confronted 
with first nature.”24 He argues that although people do not have the capacity to control 
that “second nature,” as Lukács put it in The Theory of the Novel (1914-15) and “Reification 
and the Consciousness of the Proletariat” (1923), they can at least take up an 
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apprenticeship and learn how to confront it. Film comes into play here: “art once again 
places itself at the service of such an apprenticeship—and in particular film.”25 Film is 
therefore the medium through which the audience, collectively, can better understand that 
“second nature” that, in Lukács’s words, appears incomprehensible to the individual. This 
is what Benjamin means in a fragment of his article on Battleship Potemkin, “Reply to Oscar 
A. H. Schmitz” (1927), which he later repeats almost verbatim in the “Work of Art” essay:
To put it in a nutshell, film is the prism in which the spaces of the immediate 
environment—the spaces in which people live, pursue their avocations, and enjoy their 
leisure—are laid open before their eyes in a comprehensible, meaningful, and 
passionate way. In themselves these offices, furnished rooms, saloons, big-city streets, 
stations, and factories are ugly, incomprehensible, and hopelessly sad. Or rather, they 
were and seemed to be, until the advent of film. The cinema then exploded this entire 
prison-world with the dynamite of its fractions of a second, so that now we can take 
extended journeys of adventure between their widely scattered ruins.26
This function, however, not only has to do with historically adapting human perception to 
the chaotic, fragmentary reality of modernity, as he seems to suggest in the “Work of Art” 
essay.27  It is also a question of incorporating that “second nature” into the collective 
audience, which is understood as a body, through a rush of energy. For that very reason, 
Benjamin claims: “To make the enormous technological apparatus of our time an object of 
human innervation—that is the historical task in whose service film finds its true 
meaning.”28 
AN EMANCIPATED TECHNOLOGY
 
Benjamin’s embrace of the incorporation of “second nature” and technology into the 
(collective) human body may seem uncritical. I will show, however, that Benjamin is 
calling for an adaptation to a specific type of technology; a technology which is liberated 
from its mythical pole and is conceived as promoting a positive relationship with nature. 
For that reason, he divides technology into “first technology,” which corresponds to the 
capitalist-imperialist conception of technology and exists in fusion with ritual, and 
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“second technology,” which aims at the correct interplay between humanity and nature. 
Sami Khatib has described this “second technology” as “an emancipated technology 
which would open up a new Spielraum, field of action, beyond domination and 
instrumental means-ends-relationships between nature and man.” Not surprisingly, he 
refers to this new relation of interplay as a “post-humanist constellation of nature and 
humankind.” 29  Through “second technology,” in short, Benjamin attempts to escape from 
the imperialist understanding of technology as the mastery of nature (and other human 
beings) by man.30 Benjamin was aware that social relations are embedded in technology. 
Thus, technology should not be taken as a type of determinism; it should rather be 
understood historically as a system that depends upon social structures and relations 
among people. Indeed, Benjamin thought that technology had great potential to rearrange 
and reorganize social relations. Esther Leslie argues that for Benjamin there was an 
elective affinity between technology and humanity and that art was the space where this 
elective affinity could be played out. For that reason, his writings on the politics of art 
“attempt to compensate for deficiencies in the social organization of Technik.”31 These 
deficiencies had led to a misuse of technology. In the “Work of Art” essay Benjamin 
analyses this use of technology, and claims that if the property system continues to 
impede the natural use of productive forces, the energy deployed by technology will press 
towards unnatural ends, that is, war and human annihilation.32 Art, and particularly film, 
as an emancipated “second technology,” acts as the medium through which humanity 
should perform a salutary collective adaptation of technology and help gain mastery over 
the new techno-body. 
Within posthumanism, there are different, often divergent, trends regarding the 
relationship of (post)humans with nature. Transhumanism, normally considered to be a 
different phenomenon to posthumanism, but often introduced as part of the same project, 
defends human enhancement through the incorporation of science and technology. For 
transhumanism, this incorporation is inscribed in a biological and technological evolution 
that is already changing the notion of the human. Francesca Ferrando has criticized 
transhumanism because in it “technology becomes a hierarchical project, based on 
rational thought, driven towards progression.”33 In other words, this trend is still rooted 
in the Enlightenment and in the model of rational humanism. For that reason, Ferrando 
refers to it as “ultra-humanism.” Benjamin’s theory is particularly useful here in order to 
denounce this uncritical embrace of technology by transhumanism. This trend does not 
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take into account the fact that specific conceptions of technology and science embed a 
relation of exploitation to other elements of nature – i.e. other humans, animals and the 
natural environment – and, therefore, their adoption into our own nature may support 
and encourage those exploitative relations. 
Critical posthumanism has nonetheless generally embraced environmentalism as a 
way of thinking about the world beyond the merely human. Braidotti, for example, has 
celebrated the link made by environmentalist theory “between the humanistic emphasis 
on Man as the measure of all things and the domination and exploitation of nature,” as 
well as its condemnation of “the abuses of science and technology.”34  I claim that 
Benjamin provides a more complex and interesting alternative to understanding what and 
when technology should be incorporated by humanity, inviting us to reconsider and 
rearrange our own relationship to the other elements of his broad conception of nature – 
which includes the human-made “second nature.” 
BARBARISM
 
Benjamin’s most important contribution to posthumanism comes nonetheless from his 
open battle with traditional, bourgeois humanism – although I argue that this cannot be 
understood without his previous texts on technology and anthropology. His critique of 
humanism took a programmatic character in a number of texts he wrote in the period 
ranging from 1931 to 1933, notably “The Destructive Character” (1931), “Karl 
Kraus” (1931) and “Experience and Poverty” (1933), but also his note on Mickey Mouse 
from 1931. In these texts, Benjamin reflects on the consequences of the Great War on long, 
vital experience (Erfahrung). Taking advantage of a situation that he refers to as a poverty 
of experience and culture, Benjamin calls for a programmatic rupture with tradition and 
for a “new, positive barbarism” that breaks with the cultural heritage of the past. 
According to Maria Boletsi, this poverty should not be understood as lack, but rather as 
excess: “an excess of ideas and styles and an oppressive overload of culture in which 
people are swamped.” Thus, Boletsi argues that “the answer to this new poverty should 
not be sought through an attempt to reconnect with the great past traditions, but by 
professing this poverty in order to explore new modes of being.”35 This break is first 
announced in “The Destructive Character,” an article that Benjamin wrote for the 
CINEMA 7 · MOURENZA! 39
Frankfurter Zeitung in November 1931. In this text, he praises the need for a “destructive 
character” which cleared away and rooted out the traces of that age. Only by separating 
itself from traditional, bourgeois notions of humanism, argues Benjamin, will a real 
humanism arise.
In “Experience and Poverty,” Benjamin claims that, especially because of the 
monstrous events of the First World War and its deployment of warfare technology, 
experience has fallen in value and is no longer passed from one generation to the next. In 
a Germany blighted by economic crisis, economic poverty was thus joined to a poverty of 
experience. Long, vital experience (Erfahrung), as true experience, was no longer possible, 
as he suggests in a fragment that he repeats in “The Storyteller” (1936), which focuses on 
the inability of the soldiers who returned from the First World War to tell stories about 
their experiences on the battlefield. The new world that emerged from it was, therefore, 
experientially empty. Benjamin argues that humanity should be honest enough to admit 
bankruptcy and to acknowledge that such a stage is “a new kind of barbarism.” In this 
way, once it is realized that culture and human experience are now part of a new kind of 
barbarism, says Benjamin, we can introduce “a new, positive concept of barbarism.”36 The 
positive barbarian appears here as a posthuman figure able to make that new start, to 
begin from scratch with a little and build up further. 
In contrast to the common understanding of barbarism as the opposite of civilization 
and Kultur, Benjamin famously stated that there is no document of culture free from 
barbarism.37  In similar terms to the non-dualistic relation of nature and culture, here 
Benjamin highlights the blurring distinction, and inherent interpenetration, of the two 
terms. Although Boletsi frames Benjamin’s programme of positive barbarism in the 
context of the threat of fascism, Khatib points out more accurately that it is not only 
fascism that Benjamin opposed. The point, claims Khatib, is that for Benjamin “bourgeois 
culture and Western civilization ... are inherently barbaric.”38  Thus, he suggests that 
Benjamin’s project in this age of (experiential, cultural and economic) poverty was to 
shatter the “fantasies of capitalist progress, perfectibility and sustainability.”39 Coherent 
with his fierce battle against understanding history teleologically as a continuum, 
Benjamin suggests that the idea of progress through the intensification and growth of the 
productive forces of capitalism is incompatible with a positive technological reordering of 
the relation of nature and humankind. Benjamin’s strategy, says Khatib, involves the 
radicalization of “the experience of capitalist alienation and impoverishment” to the point 
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of “exceed[ing] the horizon of bourgeois-liberal humanism.”40 At the time Benjamin wrote 
this article, Europe was faced by either the barbarism of capitalism or that of fascism. He 
was aware that barbarism could not be fought from an opposing position because culture 
and civilization are so deeply interwoven with barbarism that any effective critique must 
be made immanently, from within, adapting thinking to the impoverished reality it aims 
to change. 
POSTHUMAN CREATURES: BARBAREN AND UNMENSCHEN
As part of his programmatic barbarism, Benjamin argued that art must be mobilized in 
the creation of a new culture. The select group of barbarians that Benjamin chooses for his 
own project are mainly modernist artists such as the playwright Bertolt Brecht, the 
science-fiction writer Paul Scheerbart, the painter Paul Klee and the architect Adolf Loos, 
but also, as a representative of popular culture and the motion pictures, Mickey Mouse. 
Benjamin appreciated in the early, anarchistic figure of Mickey Mouse a playful and 
ironic relationship with technology. In “Experience and Poverty,” he hails the fact that, in 
these cartoons, the characters imbricate technology into themselves, but they do so 
without mechanizing their bodies as a result, they rather improvise technology out of 
them.41 Benjamin’s first text on Mickey Mouse was a collection of notes he wrote in 1931 
after a conversation with his friend, the banker Gustav Glück, and Brecht’s regular 
composer Kurt Weill. Benjamin welcomed the fact that Mickey Mouse characters throw 
off all human resemblance. For him, their non-resemblance to humans disrupts the 
hierarchy of the animal kingdom which supposedly culminates in mankind.42  This is, 
obviously, a new link with posthumanism and, more specifically, with its brand of 
animalism, for Benjamin criticizes the traditional understanding of the human as being on 
the top of an evolutionary pyramid that justifies their mastery over animals and other 
elements of nature. In that respect, Braidotti argues that critical posthumanism proposes a 
move beyond anthropocentrism and expands the notion of life towards the non-human or 
zoe.43  Benjamin stresses a similar point with regard to other positive barbarians, 
Scheerbart’s characters in his science-fiction novel Lesabéndio (1913), because they reject 
the principle of humanism, that is, humanlikeness.44 These characters, the inhabitants of 
the asteroid Pallas, have no gender, control the decision to increase or reduce their species 
CINEMA 7 · MOURENZA! 41
and are absorbed by younger Pallasians when dying. As good posthumans, they can also 
incorporate technology into their own bodies: they are able to transform their eyes into 
microscopes, incorporate magnifying lenses to their own photographic apparatuses and 
contort themselves into radio receivers because of the electrical qualities of their bodies. 
The fact that Scheerbart’s creatures have no gender – and no origin, since they have lived 
previously in other worlds – can also be understood as a posthuman quality. Along these 
lines, Haraway associates her cyborg dream with “the utopian tradition of imagining a 
world without gender, which is perhaps a world without genesis, but maybe also a world 
without end.”45  Miriam Hansen attempted to find in Benjamin’s writings on Mickey 
Mouse a similar complication of sexual difference, since he referred to the character with 
the feminine pronoun sie (because the German word “Maus” is feminine). In order to keep 
this gender confusion, Hansen translates it as he/she/it.46 Even if Benjamin consciously 
attempted to reflect this sexual ambiguity in Mickey Mouse cartoons, I am however 
reluctant to accept it, since they in fact project traditional gender roles onto animals. 
If Benjamin can hardly be regarded as a feminist author (some comments and attitudes 
point rather to the opposite),47 some of his utopian ideas about a new society yet to come 
contain interesting aspects regarding the re-organization of gender. These ideas were 
actually influenced by the proto-feminism of authors such as Fourier, Bachofen and Bebel 
– all of whom were significantly male. However precarious it may seem, an analogy can 
be established between Benjamin’s reconfiguration of gender relations and feminist 
posthuman theory. In her cyborg manifesto, Haraway dreamed of a hybrid of machine 
and organism that would give rise to a world without gender, where nature would not be 
distinct from the artificially-constructed world, we would fuse with animals and 
machines, avoiding any form of primacy, and would take science and technology 
seriously, as a tool at the service of a feminist-socialist political programme.48 
Notwithstanding the obvious differences between Haraway’s feminist-socialist 
programme and Benjamin’s heterodox Marxism, both recall an interpenetration of 
technology and nature that would change the organic organization of civilization into 
families. Haraway says: “The cyborg does not dream of community on the model of the 
organic family.”49  In this sense, it is similar to Benjamin’s project, since his idea of 
developing a positive relationship with nature takes technology as the indispensable 
medium with which to reorganize social relations and break with the traditional 
organization of humanity into families (as well as nations).         
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Besides the barbarian, Carlo Salzani has also linked Mickey Mouse to the inhuman or 
Unmensch, the third figure that Benjamin introduces in his essay on Karl Kraus, depicted 
as the messenger of a “more real humanism.” Salzani argues that the hybrid and 
inhuman figure of Mickey Mouse dismisses and destroys the eternal values of the false 
universalism of bourgeois humanism.50 This link can, in fact, be traced back to the 1931 
note on Mickey Mouse, in which Benjamin argued that “In these films, mankind makes 
preparations to survive civilization.”51 This is indeed a turn of phrase from his essay on 
Karl Kraus written earlier that year. In that essay, Benjamin claimed that in Kraus’s 
satiric, journalistic and theatrical work “civilization prepares to survive.”52 In order to 
step onto the new stage, Benjamin claims that humankind will have to merge with 
technology, unlike the average European, who “has not succeeded in uniting his life 
with technology, because he has clung to the ideology of creative existence.”53 Benjamin 
associates this “creative existence” with a dilettante indulging in his creation. By 
contrast, he argues that a more real humanism will prove itself only through 
destruction. Benjamin detects in the anarchistic, destructive frenzy of the early Mickey 
Mouse the potential to radicalize the experience of capitalism and its technologization 
of all aspects of everyday life to the point of exceeding the model of the human 
constructed and defended by liberal humanism. Only in this way, and not by means of 
the myth of creativity, will humanity create through technology a new model of the 
(post)human. 
This posthuman model, argues Benjamin, is devised in opposition to both the “new 
man” and Nietzsche’s Übermensch. Some authors on posthumanism have embraced 
Nietzsche as a potential source for their theories.54 Such a reading is primarily based on 
the first part of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, in which Nietzsche claims that now God is dead, 
the human shall be overcome and replaced by the Übermensch, who will treat humans as 
the same laughingstock or cause of shame that apes are for humans.55 In contrast to the 
heroic vision of the Übermensch, Benjamin scholars such as Uwe Steiner and Matthew 
Charles have already noted the imperfectness of Benjamin’s posthuman creatures. 
While, in the aphorism 900 in The Will to Power, Nietzsche speaks of “another type of 
barbarian,” who “comes from the heights: a species of conquering and ruling natures, in 
search of material to mold,”56  the image of the positive barbarian is diametrically 
opposed to this. Benjamin’s barbarian is antiheroic and words such as conquering or 
mastering are not in his vocabulary. As I have emphasized, Benjamin called for the 
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adoption of a technology that would produce a relation of interplay between humanity 
and nature, but never a relationship of domination of one over the other. The Unmensch 
and the barbarian, who unite their lives with technology, adopt precisely this type of 
technology, i.e. “second technology.” Steiner thus argues that, “For the perspective of 
technology, Benjamin’s positive barbarism is conceived as antiheroic.”57 Furthermore, 
Steiner claims that his disconcerting definition of politics in “World and 
Time” (1919-1920) – “the fulfillment of an unimproved [ungesteigerten] humanity”58 – 
can only be understood as “a turn of phrase in opposition to Nietzsche.”59 In a fragment 
from the same time, “Capitalism as Religion” (1921), Benjamin reads the conception of 
the Übermensch as a “breaking open of the heavens by an intensified [gesteigerte] 
humanity.”60  For Benjamin, the Übermensch is “the first to recognize the religion of 
capitalism and begin to bring it to fulfillment.”61  The Unmensch appears thus at the 
other pole of this posthuman submission to capitalism.62 
Matthew Charles understands this opposition between Benjamin’s and Nietzsche’s 
creatures as a critique of the individualism of the latter. He argues that Benjamin’s 
Unmensch is an inversion of Nietzsche’s superhuman, devised as a figure able to surpass 
the individualism of bourgeois humanism.63 Benjamin thought that a positive adoption of 
technology would produce a collective body in which social relations could be rearranged 
and put to humane ends. For this to happen, Benjamin argued that, as he put it in the 
“Surrealism” essay, the dialectical annihilation of the bourgeois individual psyche was 
necessary, because only thus could the new, collective body organized in technology be 
born or reappropriated by the proletariat. This idea is taken further in a paralipomenon to 
the “Karl Kraus” essay, in which Benjamin states that humanity “must be abandoned on 
the level of individual existence so that it can come forth at the level of collective 
existence.”64  Benjamin’s collective, imperfect Unmensch may thus provide a better 
posthuman model to oppose to the humanist prototype of the human as a white, male, 
individual, liberal self than Nietzsche’s Übermensch – more than anything because of its 
anticapitalist and anti-individualist stance. Furthermore, the Unmensch also stands in 
opposition to transhumanism, which has been criticized by Pramod K. Nayar for being “a 
hagiography of techno-modifications of the human,” since it believes in the perfectability 
of the human, considering the biological limitations of the body something to be 
transcended by technology.65  
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CONCLUSION
Mickey Mouse and the other creatures of his films do not engage with technology as an 
external force, but rather, as Miriam Hansen points out, “they hyperbolize the historical 
imbrications of nature and technology through humour and parody.”66 In this way, these 
films accomplish the function that Benjamin assigned technological art, that is, to play out 
the affinity between technology and humanity, in this case through a humoristic and 
hyperbolic representation of the promises of technology. Mickey Mouse appears, then, as 
a posthuman figure who has blurred the boundaries between nature and technology, 
between man and animal. It is also worth noting that Benjamin’s programme of a “new, 
positive barbarism” aims to pursue a more real humanism – hence, far from an anti-
humanism that would presuppose the death of man. His objective is rather to escape from 
the model of bourgeois humanism, which understands the human, first of all, as an 
individual, which, in turn, belongs to traditional (discriminatory) formations such as 
families and nations. I suggest that Benjamin’s programme should be complemented by 
other (feminist and postcolonial) posthumanist theories which have criticised this model 
for being based on a white, European male. Nonetheless, I hope that, in this article, I have 
demonstrated Benjamin’s relevance to current debates on posthumanism. It has been my 
intention to show that his philosophy may be especially relevant because it enfolds the 
traditional binary oppositions of nature and culture, human body and technology, 
barbarism and civilization into more complex constellations. Finally, I would like to argue 
that the creatures he devises in opposition to the bourgeois subject may also be highly 
appropriate in envisaging potential configurations of the posthuman.
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